Cyberstalking awareness has gone "global" no matter where you live or who you are cyberstalking can happen to you

Survivors In Action is honored to support the efforts of Euro Weekly News and their 'Women Reclaim the Web' program, to help promote cyberstalking awareness.

Cyberstalking awareness is something that I am personally very passionate about. Being cyberstalked myself for a few years, I endured hell, and learned very quickly that law enforcement was not prepared to help. Because of this, I had two choices:
1) I could sit on the sidelines and be derailed by the cyberstalker; or
2) I could take action and help promote awareness, so that "no victim is left behind" and left to endure the hell alone as I was

Survivors In Action is taking option number 2, and that is something I am very proud of. Thanks to over three thousand volunteers, victims of crime now have a new resource to turn to. Sadly however, Survivors In Action's work is far from over. Cyberstalking awareness is at an all time low in the U.S. Thousands of victims every month who bravely seek help are being ignored, or are denied help altogether. Without resources being allocated to organizations like Survivors In Action, this problem will continue.

There is not enough training regarding the subject of cyberstalking; and tragically, victims of cyberstalking continue to fall through the cracks. Restraining orders don't work to prohibit cyberstalking, and those who report the crime to law enforcement often still find themselves being ignored or given the run around - even today, as we near 2010.

There are very few resources out there for victims. It is inevitable that as the use of technology continues to grow, so will the number of victims who are cyberstalked.
Christopher Burgess, tech security expert, author and SIA advisory board member, explained clearly that "cyberstalking is not a new phenomena". This makes matters even worse, as it is proof that our nation has continued to ignore the problem for years now. The majority of victims suffer harassment, and are ignored by law enforcement and government officials.

Graham Brown-Martin, a cyberstalking victim turned advocate, has done great things in the UK to help expose the harsh realities faced by victims. His cyberstalking documentary is a must see, and includes the intimate details of his family's experience of cyberstalking.

The U.S. must do more to help promote awareness regarding the subject of cyberstalking. Law enforcement, prosecutors, advocates, and the general public, need to be informed of this crime, now more than ever.

As technology evolves, so do cyberstalker's maneuvers. Survivors In Action is proud of their efforts to serve victims of cyberstalking, to ensure that "No Victim is Left Behind". Even though Survivors In Action is taking an active part in the solution, there is still much more work that needs to be done. This is work that SIA is not able to do because of lack of funding and resources.

We need the public's support now more than ever to help send the message loud and clear to public officials across the U.S. We need to let them know that cyberstalking is a real crime that must be addressed with "real" efforts, so that "No Victim is Left Behind".

If you are a victim of cyberstalking, please visit the Survivors In Action site today for more information.


Survivors In Action
"No Victim Left Behind"

Social networking proves to be useful tool for public safety

Social networking has become a familiar tool utilized by many to keep in touch with friends and family. Today social networking is also an effective communication tool for those who work in public safety.

In November of 2008, Alexis A. Moore a cyberstalking expert and privacy consultant founded Crime Victim Organization & Advocate Network, our nation's first list serve that successfully unites crime victim organizations, victim advocates, law enforcement, prosecutors and forensic medical examiners on-line in real time improving the effectiveness of victim response and support services.

This list serve allows members to collaborate in real time regarding all issues pertaining to public safety including legislation, training, education, fundraising, job opportunities and specific case support requests for those serving victims of crime.

With the budget constraints facing the public and private sector today it is imperative that tools like CVON are utilized by officials and advocates to ensure no victim is left behind.

Many public safety officials and crime victim advocacy organizations are facing strict budget constraints which prohibit them from traveling to attend conferences and trainings outside of their offices.

Today with social networking sites these groups keep informed and share information in real time for little to no cost. This is great news for crime victims and those who serve, support and protect them.

Group home page: Crime Victim Organization & Advocate Network

Survivors In Action
"No Victim Left Behind"

GPS monitoring valuable evidentiary tool for law enforcement and prosecutors in stalking cases

Wisconsin Court Appeals grants use of GPS for evidentiary purposes in stalking cases. Although the opinion indicates this was with much reservation, this is a victory for stalking victims who far too often encounter years of harassment without the evidence necessary to convict the stalker.

There is much more our legislature needs to do to ensure that the use of GPS monitoring of domestic batterers and stalkers is available and not met with resistance so that "No Victim is Left Behind".

I support the use of GPS technology in stalking and domestic violence cases.

No one should have to live or work in fear.

###

Appeal No.
2008AP658-CR
Cir. Ct. No. 2003CF1783
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

MICHAEL A. SVEUM,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Dane County: STEVEN D. EBERT, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Dykman, Lundsten and Bridge, JJ.

¶1 LUNDSTEN, J. Michael Sveum challenges his aggravated stalking conviction. At Sveum’s jury trial, the prosecution presented detailed tracking information about the movements of Sveum’s car obtained from a Global Positioning System tracking device (GPS device) that police secretly attached to his car. Sveum argues that the police obtained this tracking information in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The State responds that no Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurs when police attach a GPS device to the outside of a vehicle while it is in a place accessible to the public and then use that device to track the vehicle while it is in public view. We agree with the State. At the same time, we urge the legislature to consider regulating both police and private use of GPS tracking technology.

¶2 Sveum’s other challenges to his conviction include whether the GPS tracking information should be suppressed under the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law, whether a search warrant for Sveum’s residence and car was valid, whether the circuit court committed error by admitting evidence of Sveum’s prior stalking conviction, whether Sveum’s trial counsel was ineffective, and whether an erroneous jury instruction requires a new trial. We reject all of Sveum’s arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

Background

¶3 Sveum was convicted of stalking Jamie Johnson in 1996 and was later imprisoned for related crimes against Johnson. In 1999, from prison, he began stalking Johnson again with help from his sister. Sveum continued stalking Johnson when he was released from prison in 2002. In March 2003, Johnson reported to the police that she believed Sveum was stalking her again.

¶4 As part of their investigation, police sought and received a warrant authorizing them to covertly attach a GPS device to Sveum’s car in order to track it. Based in part on tracking information retrieved from the GPS device, the police obtained a warrant to search one of Sveum’s residences and his car.[1] The search revealed additional evidence incriminating Sveum, along with evidence confirming his sister’s involvement.

¶5 Sveum was charged with an aggravated stalking offense under WIS. STAT. § 940.32(2) and (3)(b) (2001-02), as party to a crime.[2] The more serious “aggravated” version of the crime was charged based on Sveum’s previous conviction for stalking Johnson. See § 940.32(3)(b). The circuit court denied motions by Sveum to suppress evidence obtained from the GPS device and from the search of his residence and car. A jury found Sveum guilty, and the court sentenced him to seven years and six months in prison followed by five years of extended supervision. We discuss additional facts as needed below.

Discussion

A. Suppression Of GPS Evidence Under Fourth Amendment

¶6 Sveum challenges the admission of GPS tracking information showing the movements of his car. He argues that the warrant[3] authorizing police to place the GPS device on his car was overly broad. The State responds that the warrant was unnecessary because no Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurred. In reply, Sveum implicitly concedes that placing the GPS device on his car and using it to monitor public travel does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. He contends, however, that because the GPS device permitted the police to monitor the location of his car while it was in his garage and in his employer’s garage, places out of public view, all of the information obtained from the GPS device should have been suppressed. Because we agree with the State that no Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurred, we do not address Sveum’s warrant argument.

¶7 We begin with a recap of the pertinent facts. The battery-powered GPS device used here periodically receives and stores location information from one or more satellites. To obtain tracking information, the device must be physically retrieved and its information downloaded to a computer. The result is a detailed history, including time information, of the device’s location and, hence, the vehicle’s location. While Sveum’s car was in his driveway, police secretly attached the device to the underside of his car with a magnet and tape. The police tracked Sveum’s car with the device for about five weeks. During this time, Sveum parked his car in his enclosed garage and inside a garage at his place of employment, a car care center.

¶8 We agree with the State that neither a search nor a seizure occurs when the police use a GPS device to track a vehicle while it is visible to the general public. The seminal cases on this topic are United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).

¶9 In Knotts, government agents planted a “beeper”—a radio transmitter emitting periodic signals that permit tracking with a radio receiver—inside a five-gallon drum. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277-78. Using the beeper, the agents were able to track a vehicle transporting the drum and determine that it had come to rest on the defendant’s premises. Id. at 277-78, 282, 284-85. The Court held that the monitoring of the beeper while the vehicle was in public view did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy and, therefore, did not constitute a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 285. The Court reasoned that the device simply made it easier to discover what was already “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.” See id. at 281-82. The Court explained:

A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When [one of the defendant’s accomplices] traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.

... [N]o ... expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation of [the] automobile arriving on [the private] premises after leaving a public highway, nor to movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the cabin in the “open fields.”

Visual surveillance from public places along [the] route or adjoining Knotts’ premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police.

Id. (citation omitted). The Knotts Court specifically noted that “nothing in [the] record indicates that the beeper signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that the drum … had ended its automotive journey to rest on [defendant]’s premises.” Id. at 284-85. Similarly, “there [was] no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the drum within the [premises], or in any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin.” Id. at 285. Thus, the Court concluded, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. Id.

¶10 In contrast, a year later in Karo, the Court concluded that when police used a similar beeper planted in a similar container to determine how long the container remained at certain locations and to reveal the specific location of the container within a storage facility, a Fourth Amendment search occurred. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 708-10, 717-18 & n.5. The Karo Court explained that the government used the device to obtain “information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house.” See id. at 715-16.

¶11 Knotts and Karo teach that, to the extent a tracking device reveals vehicle travel information visible to the general public, and thus obtainable by warrantless visual surveillance, the use of the device does not normally implicate Fourth Amendment protections. It follows that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred here simply because the police used a GPS device to obtain information about Sveum’s car that was visible to the general public.

¶12 We also agree with the State that the police action of attaching the GPS device to Sveum’s car, either by itself or in combination with subsequent tracking, does not constitute a search or seizure.[4] The State aptly relies on United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).

¶13 The Garcia court concluded that attaching a GPS device to a car while the car was in a public place did not convert the subsequent tracking into a Fourth Amendment search. See id. at 996-98. The court reasoned:

[I]f police follow a car around, or observe its route by means of cameras mounted on lampposts or of satellite imaging as in Google Earth, there is no search. Well, but the tracking in this case was by satellite. Instead of transmitting images, the satellite transmitted geophysical coordinates. The only difference is that in the imaging case nothing touches the vehicle, while in the case at hand the tracking device does. But it is a distinction without any practical difference.

Id. at 997. Like the Seventh Circuit, we discern no privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment that is invaded when police attach a GPS device to the outside of a vehicle, as long as the information obtained is the same as could be gained by the use of other techniques that do not require a warrant.

¶14 Sveum might respond that, unlike Garcia, the police here did not attach the GPS device while his car was parked in a public place. However, the circuit court concluded that Sveum’s driveway was not constitutionally protected “curtilage,” and Sveum does not challenge this ruling or otherwise present a developed argument as to why the police engaged in a search or seizure by entering his driveway.

¶15 Accordingly, we follow Garcia’s lead and conclude that the attachment of a GPS device to Sveum’s car does not change our view that, under Knotts and Karo, no Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurred here.

¶16 Sveum argues that all of the tracking information should be suppressed because the GPS device monitored the location of his car when it was out of public view. We reject this argument for two reasons.

¶17 First, although the police presumably obtained location information while Sveum’s car was inside areas not open to surveillance, there is no indication that this same information could not have been obtained by visual surveillance from outside these enclosures. Such surveillance could have told the police when Sveum’s car entered or exited his garage and the garage at his workplace and, therefore, informed them when his car remained in those places. Sveum does not argue that the police used the GPS device to track his car’s movements within the enclosures.

¶18 Second, even if the police had obtained some information about the movement of Sveum’s car within the enclosures and this information should have been suppressed, Sveum suggests no reason why all of the tracking information should be suppressed. Although we need not exhaustively analyze this issue, we note that properly obtained evidence is generally not excluded simply because a search is illegally extended to improperly obtain evidence. See State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 454-55, 343 N.W.2d 391 (1984) (“Insofar as the searcher exceeds the scope of the validly authorized search, items so seized must be suppressed. However, as to those items discovered in the lawful execution of the valid part of the warrant, the Fourth Amendment does not require suppression.”). Similarly, properly obtained and incriminating wiretap information is not suppressed solely because police also overhear unrelated private conversations that they would otherwise have no right to overhear.[5] It is not apparent why a balancing of interests should not produce the same rule when applied to the GPS tracking situation here.

¶19 Accordingly, we conclude that no Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurs when police attach a GPS device to the outside of a vehicle while it is in a place accessible to the public and then use that device to track the vehicle while it is in public view. Because this case does not involve tracking information on the movement of Sveum’s car within a place protected by the Fourth Amendment, it follows that the circuit court correctly rejected Sveum’s Fourth Amendment suppression argument.

¶20 We are more than a little troubled by the conclusion that no Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurs when police use a GPS or similar device as they have here. So far as we can tell, existing law does not limit the government’s use of tracking devices to investigations of legitimate criminal suspects. If there is no Fourth Amendment search or seizure, police are seemingly free to secretly track anyone’s public movements with a GPS device. As the Seventh Circuit observed:

The new technologies enable, as the old (because of expense) do not, wholesale surveillance. One can imagine the police affixing GPS tracking devices to thousands of cars at random, recovering the devices, and using digital search techniques to identify suspicious driving patterns. One can even imagine a law requiring all new cars to come equipped with the device so that the government can keep track of all vehicular movement in the United States….

….

Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive.

Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.

¶21 We are also concerned about the private use of GPS surveillance devices. As the Seventh Circuit and a recent New York Times article indicate, GPS technology is available at low cost to the general public. See Garcia, 474 F.3d at 995; David Pogue, Peekaboo, Zoombak Sees You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at B1, B8. Although there are obviously legitimate private uses, such as a trucking company monitoring the location of its trucks, there are also many private uses that most reasonable people would agree should be prohibited.[6]

¶22 Consequently, we urge the legislature to explore imposing limitations on the use of GPS and similar devices by both government and private actors. Such limitations would appear to be consistent with limitations the legislature has placed on electronic intercepts of communications. See Wisconsin’s Electronic Surveillance Control Law, WIS. STAT. §§ 968.27-.33 (2007-08).[7]

B. Suppression Of GPS Evidence Under Electronic Surveillance Control Law

¶23 As we have seen, the GPS device used here recorded location information that was downloaded from the device after it was retrieved from Sveum’s car. The device did not emit a signal permitting the police to contemporaneously track Sveum’s car. It is this aspect of the GPS device that prompts Sveum to challenge its use under Wisconsin’s Electronic Surveillance Control Law, WIS. STAT. §§ 968.27-.33.

¶24 The Electronic Surveillance Control Law governs the lawfulness and uses of intercepts of “wire, electronic or oral communications.” See WIS. STAT. §§ 968.28-.31. The law governs the in-court disclosure of the contents of intercepts of “electronic communications.” See WIS. STAT. § 968.29; State v. Gilmore, 201 Wis. 2d 820, 825, 549 N.W.2d 401 (1996) (“Wisconsin Stat. § 968.29 states the conditions under which disclosure is authorized.”).

¶25 Sveum argues that the GPS evidence here was obtained from “electronic communication[s]” covered by the Electronic Surveillance Control Law and should have been suppressed because of noncompliance with several provisions in the law. The threshold question is whether the GPS device used to track Sveum’s car produced covered electronic communications or, instead, is excluded from the law’s coverage because it is a “tracking device” under WIS. STAT. § 968.27(4)(d). This threshold question involves the application of a statute to undisputed facts, a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d 243, 247, 448 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1989). We give statutory language its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. Also, we must construe statutes to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id., ¶46.

¶26 As Sveum acknowledges, the Electronic Surveillance Control Law expressly excludes from the definition of “electronic communication” those communications from tracking devices. WISCONSIN STAT. § 968.27(4)(d) provides, in pertinent part:

“Electronic communication” does not include any of the following:

....

(d) Any communication from a tracking device.

“[T]racking device” is not defined in the statute, but we agree with the State that the GPS device here is such a device because, so far as the record discloses, its sole function was to track the location of Sveum’s car.

¶27 Our Electronic Surveillance Control Law is modeled on a federal act, and Sveum asserts that the “statutory history” of the federal act defines a tracking device as a communication device that “emits a signal” that can be received by special tracking equipment to trace location. Sveum argues that the GPS device here is not a “tracking device” because it does not emit any signal. Rather, it receives signals and stores data that can be retrieved later. We are not persuaded.

¶28 Sveum provides only a record citation for his “statutory history” argument, and it leaves unclear what legal authority he is relying on. Our research, based on the limited information referenced in the record, suggests that Sveum is relying on a Senate Report that accompanied the 1986 update to the federal act. The Report includes a preliminary “glossary,” which defines “electronic tracking devices (transponders)” as Sveum’s argument indicates. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at *10 (1986). Sveum’s reliance on this Senate Report, however, runs headlong into the express language of the enacted federal law, which broadly defines a “tracking device” as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.” See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2510(12)(D) (incorporating the definition in 18 U.S.C.S. § 3117). Indeed, the Senate Report, in its “section-by-section” analysis of the act, references the same definition that appears in the enacted statutes. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at *33-34. Sveum does not explain why the “glossary” definition in the Senate Report should control over this plain-language statutory definition, which obviously covers the GPS device used here. Regardless whether it emitted a signal, the GPS device enabled the police to track, after the fact, the movements of Sveum’s car.

¶29 Sveum also points out that the tracking device exception in our Electronic Surveillance Control Law refers to “[a]ny communication from a tracking device.” WIS. STAT. § 968.27(4)(d) (emphasis added). He argues that this phrasing shows that the exception applies only to devices that emit some sort of signal, not to a device like a GPS device that only receives and records data for access at a later time. Sveum’s argument, however, erroneously assumes that the communication “from” the device must be simultaneous with the tracked movement. But the statutory language imposes no such requirement. Although obtained later, the information did indeed come “from” the tracking device.

¶30 Moreover, the distinction Sveum suggests is not reasonable. It is not rational to limit the admission of tracking information based on whether it is obtained in real time by a signal or at a later time by direct access to the device. Thus, Sveum’s interpretation of the statute would lead to unreasonable results.

C. Search Warrant For Sveum’s Residence And Car

¶31 Sveum divides his challenge to the search warrant for his residence and his car into two categories. First, he argues that the warrant application lacked probable cause. Second, he argues that the warrant did not describe the items to be seized with sufficient particularity. We address each in turn.

1. Probable Cause

¶32 Our duty on review is limited to ensuring that the warrant-issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 133, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990). We accord great deference to the judge’s probable cause determination; that determination will stand unless the defendant establishes that the facts are clearly insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991).

¶33 Sveum argues that there was insufficient probable cause for the warrant to authorize seizure of the following items: journals, calendars, logs documenting travel or appointments, binoculars, flashlights, ski masks, documents mentioning Johnson and certain other individuals, and personal information related to Johnson or her family.

¶34 Sveum concedes that the warrant affidavit established that he used or kept many such items in connection with his 1996 stalking conviction, but asserts that the application did not provide probable cause to believe that he was keeping such items in 2003.[8] We disagree.

¶35 The warrant affidavit stated that the affiant was a detective with twenty-two years of experience who had specialized training in stalking crimes. See State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶43, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437 (experience and special knowledge of police officers who are applying for search warrant are facts that warrant-issuing judge may consider). The detective explained in the affidavit that, based on her training and experience, individuals who engage in stalking behavior often display an obsessive personality and exhibit a pattern of conduct, including maintaining visual proximity to the victim, contacting the victim, and keeping records, journals, or other documents memorializing their stalking behavior. Also, such individuals often keep evidence of their obsession with the victim, including records, journals, diaries, calendars of the victim’s activities or the activities of other family members, personal information, or computer records.

¶36 The affidavit also indicated that the affiant had investigated Sveum’s prior stalking crime, and it detailed the many ways that Sveum’s conduct surrounding the 1996 conviction was consistent with behaviors characteristically exhibited by individuals who stalk. In particular, Sveum at that time kept calendars marking down anniversary dates of his time with Johnson, tracked the mileage on Johnson’s car, documented Johnson’s whereabouts, and retained “keepsakes,” including earrings, underwear, and a duplicate driver’s license of Johnson’s. The affidavit also outlined the evidence establishing that Sveum was again stalking Johnson in 2003.

¶37 When we consider all of the information in the warrant affidavit, we conclude that the affidavit established probable cause to believe that the items enumerated could be evidence of Sveum’s 2003 stalking crime.

¶38 Sveum argues that the warrant should not have allowed police to seize computer equipment because the warrant affidavit lacked specific facts to show that a computer may have contained evidence of stalking. He asserts that nothing in the affidavit shows that he used a computer in the 1996 stalking. We are not persuaded. It is readily inferable from the warrant affidavit that Sveum’s past stalking conduct involved obsessively detailed logging, calendaring, and tracking of information relating to Johnson. Given this inference, along with the increasing prevalence of computerized information and personal computing between 1996 and 2003, the warrant-issuing judge could have reasonably inferred that Sveum may have been using a computer in connection with stalking Johnson in 2003 even if he had not used a computer to stalk Johnson in 1996. See State v. Benoit, 83 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 265 N.W.2d 298 (1978) (warrant judge may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented in the affidavit).

2. Particularity

¶39 Sveum argues that the warrant failed to describe the items sought with sufficient particularity. Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Our supreme court has recognized that, in practice, this means that a warrant should describe items to be seized “with as much particularity and specificity as the circumstances and the nature of activity under investigation permit[].” See State v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 541, 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991).

¶40 Sveum’s particularity argument is that the many items authorized for seizure were so “non-specific” that the warrant was an invalid general warrant. Police were authorized to seize phone bills, journals, calendars, logs, computers and devices related to computers, cameras and film, binoculars, flashlights, ski masks, audio and/or video recording equipment in any format, and evidence that might identify the residents of the searched dwelling. Sveum also argues that the warrant lacked probable cause to seize some of the types of items identified in the warrant because he and his mother occupied the residence and the warrant lacked objective standards by which the executing officers could differentiate items his mother owned. We reject Sveum’s arguments. We perceive no reason, at least in this case, why guidelines would have been helpful or necessary. Tellingly, Sveum does not suggest what sorts of ownership guidelines would have been required to satisfy his view of the particularity requirement. We conclude that the warrant described the items to be seized with as much particularity and specificity as the circumstances and the nature of Sveum’s alleged stalking activity permitted.

¶41 Furthermore, the two cases on which Sveum places primary reliance actually cut against him. In People v. Prall, 145 N.E. 610 (Ill. 1924), the authorities could have, but did not, describe the stolen property sought with precision by reference to serial numbers. See id. at 612. No similar identifying information could have assisted in limiting the seizures here.

¶42 Sveum’s reliance on United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1977), is similarly misplaced. Klein involved whether the description, “pirate reproduction,” sufficiently informed the officers executing a warrant how to distinguish between pirated and non-pirated merchandise. See id. at 184-87. But that case makes plain the court’s view that differentiating between the two types of merchandise was a technical endeavor based on criteria that would not generally have been known to the police officers executing the warrant. See id. at 186 & n.5, 188-89.[9]

D. Evidence Of Prior Stalking Conviction

¶43 Sveum was convicted of aggravated stalking based on his 1996 stalking conviction. Proof of this particular aggravated stalking crime requires proof of a previous conviction for a violent crime or a stalking crime involving the same victim pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 940.32(3)(b). Sveum argues that the circuit court erred by admitting evidence of his prior stalking conviction after he had agreed to stipulate to the conviction. The legal basis for Sveum’s argument is difficult to discern, but he relies on State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997), a case holding that a defendant’s prior drunk driving convictions should not have gone to the jury, even though proof of the prior convictions was necessary to prove the drunk driving charge at issue in that case. Whatever persuasive value Alexander may have had in a stalking case was put to rest in State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, ¶40, __ Wis. 2d __, 759 N.W.2d 557. In Warbelton, also a stalking case, the court expressly declined to apply Alexander and held that Alexander applies only to drunk driving prosecutions. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, ¶¶3, 46, 61. We are bound by Warbelton.

E. Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel

¶44 Sveum argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in several respects. The two-pronged deficient performance/prejudice test we apply to such claims is well established and we do not repeat it in further detail here. We address each of Sveum’s ineffective assistance claims in the sections that follow.

1. Jury Selection

¶45 Sveum argues that counsel was ineffective during jury selection by failing to ask potential jurors whether knowledge of Sveum’s prior conviction for stalking Johnson would prevent them from being fair and impartial. It appears that Sveum has not demonstrated either deficient performance or prejudice, but we will limit our discussion to his failure to show prejudice.

¶46 Sveum’s prejudice argument consists only of the speculative assertion that “due to counsel’s deficiency, there is no assurance that Sveum’s … right to an impartial jury was honored” (emphasis added). In the face of the same argument in the context of a sexual assault charge, we explained that the defendant “needed to show that if his trial counsel had asked more or better questions, those questions would have resulted in the discovery of bias on the part of at least one of the jurors who actually decided his case.” State v. Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶¶11-16, 248 Wis. 2d 259, 635 N.W.2d 838. As in Koller, Sveum makes no such showing.

2. Evidence Of Pending Appeal

¶47 At the time of Sveum’s trial in this case in 2006, an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus attacking his 1996 conviction was pending. Sveum points to language in WIS. STAT. § 906.09(5) (2005-06), which provides that “[e]vidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible,” and argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to introduce evidence of his pending appeal.

¶48 The State responds that, because the pending appeal was not a direct appeal but a collateral challenge after Sveum’s direct appeal failed, the pending appeal was not an “appeal” within the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 906.09(5) (2005-06). We need not address this argument because, regardless of the proper interpretation of the statute, Sveum has not demonstrated deficient performance or prejudice. We agree with the State’s alternative argument that it would have been a reasonable strategic choice by counsel not to introduce evidence of the pending challenge to Sveum’s 1996 conviction because the prosecutor would have countered with damaging proof that Sveum’s direct appeal from the 1996 conviction had failed.

3. Cross-Examination Of The Alleged Stalking Victim

¶49 At trial, Johnson, the stalking victim, provided strong testimony against Sveum, such as her assertion that, during one encounter in 1994, Sveum grabbed her and told her that one day when she came home he would be hiding in the bushes and would blow her head off. Sveum argues that it was, therefore, critical to impeach Johnson’s credibility and that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel failed to use information Sveum provided to cross-examine Johnson. For example, Sveum says he advised his counsel about police reports proving that Johnson had voluntary contacts with him after the alleged threat, and that counsel failed to use this information to impeach Johnson.

¶50 We have examined each cross-examination failure Sveum alleges, and conclude that he has failed to show ineffective assistance. For example, we agree that if Johnson had voluntary contact with Sveum after the alleged death threat, such contact might lead a jury to think it less likely that the threat occurred. Sveum cites State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶64, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305, to support this common-sense observation. But, just as the Thiel court concluded that the failure to use such information to impeach the victim, standing alone, did not undermine the court’s confidence in the outcome, see id., ¶81, we similarly conclude that the failure does not undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdict here.

¶51 We agree with the circuit court that, given the long history of Sveum’s stalking conduct toward Johnson, attempts to impeach Johnson as Sveum suggests could easily have backfired. Moreover, much of the information Sveum relies on could have been readily explainable, and none of it would have been likely to have destroyed Johnson’s credibility or made her seem less credible than Sveum. Sveum chose not to testify and, even assuming he had, it strains credulity to think the jury would have found him more credible than Johnson. The evidence at trial, which included Sveum’s sister’s testimony and correspondence between Sveum and his sister, showed that Sveum was highly deceptive and manipulative. Accordingly, Sveum has not shown deficient performance or prejudice based on counsel’s failure to cross-examine Johnson with the information identified.

4. Failure To Object During Sveum’s Sister’s Testimony

¶52 Under cross-examination, Sveum’s counsel elicited testimony from Sveum’s sister, Renee, that she knew Sveum well and would not have helped Sveum if she thought he would harm Johnson. On redirect, the State asked Renee if she knew that Sveum had threatened to blow Johnson’s head off, and Renee replied, “no.” Sveum argues that, because Renee was the first witness to testify and Johnson had not yet testified about Sveum’s threat, counsel was ineffective by failing to object for lack of foundation. This argument is meritless. Although it appears to be true that the question lacked a foundation when asked because Johnson had yet to testify, we agree with the State that the same question could have been posed to Sveum’s sister either by recalling her after Johnson testified or by permitting the question in hypothetical form because it was known that Johnson would testify about the death threat.

5. Failure To Request Limiting Instruction On Other Acts Evidence

¶53 The prosecutor presented evidence of Sveum’s 1996 conviction for stalking Johnson and Sveum’s behavior underlying that conviction. This evidence included Johnson’s testimony that, among other things, Sveum went into Johnson’s car and removed items, had a key made when Johnson got a different car, and left phone messages saying that Johnson would “be sorry” if she did not pick up the phone. Sveum asserts that this was “other acts” evidence and that his counsel should have requested a limiting instruction explaining to the jury that this evidence could not be used to infer that he had a propensity to commit this type of crime.

¶54 Sveum does not explain why a limiting instruction would likely have made a difference in the verdict in light of the types of concerns associated with other acts evidence. Rather, his argument seems to be that counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction was per se deficient performance and resulted in per se prejudice. We disagree.

¶55 WISCONSIN STAT. § 901.06 (2005-06) provides: “When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the judge, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” Thus, this statute requires an instruction when one is requested. The logical corollary is that an instruction is not required every time evidence is admitted for one purpose, but is not admissible for another, and, therefore, it is not per se deficient performance to fail to request an instruction.

¶56 Sveum also asserts that counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction implicates double jeopardy, the statute of limitations, due process, and equal protection. We agree with the State that these arguments are insufficiently developed and, therefore, address them no further. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (we need not consider arguments that are inadequately briefed).

F. Erroneous Jury Instruction

¶57 The parties agree that the jury instruction on one element of stalking, under WIS. STAT. § 940.32(3), was partially incorrect. Specifically, as to the “course of conduct” element, the jury was instructed that the acts constituting a “course of conduct” are limited to:

1) “maintaining visual or physical proximity to Jamie Johnson,” or

2) “contacting Jamie Johnson by telephone or causing Jamie Johnson’s telephone or any other person’s telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously regardless of whether a conversation ensues,” or

3) “causing any person to engage in either of the acts described [above].”

The causing-any-person part of this instruction was incorrect because of its reference to the two acts described in items 1) and 2). The “causing any person” alternative did not, at the relevant time, include causing these two acts. See § 940.32(1)(a) (2001-02). Thus, the jury was erroneously told that the “course of conduct” element could be met if Sveum caused his sister Renee to engage in either of these acts.[10]

¶58 Sveum correctly argues that this type of instructional error was cause for reversal in United States Supreme Court cases as recent as Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990). Since Boyde, however, the Court has concluded that harmless error analysis applies to such error. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 129 S. Ct. 530, 532 (2008). We agree with the State that the error here was harmless.

¶59 For purposes of our harmless error discussion, we will assume without deciding that Sveum is correct that the proper harmless error test is the one set forth in State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). Under Dyess, the State must establish that there is “no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” Id. at 543. Sveum argues that the test is not met here because it is impossible to know whether one or more of the jurors voted to convict him relying solely on evidence that he caused his sister to engage in stalking conduct. We are confident that did not occur.

¶60 The jury heard evidence that Sveum’s sister maintained proximity to Johnson or made prohibited phone contacts to Johnson at Sveum’s behest while he was in prison. But the jury also heard essentially uncontested evidence that, soon after Sveum was released from electronic monitoring, he began making hang-up calls to Johnson, often immediately after she arrived home. This evidence demonstrated not only that Sveum was engaging in prohibited phone contacts, but that he was also maintaining visual or physical proximity to Johnson on a recurring basis. Moreover, with exceptions not relevant here, Sveum’s trial counsel did not attempt to persuade the jury that Sveum did not engage in the conduct alleged after he was released from prison. Rather, counsel disputed other elements. Counsel candidly stated in closing argument: “[Y]ou’re asked to take a course of conduct which obviously is present and still decide if what happened here is stalking.” (Emphasis added.) Counsel continued: “The course of conduct is present but you’re being asked to decide if the other elements of the crime are also present ….”

¶61 We perceive no reason why any juror would have rejected evidence of Sveum’s post-incarceration behavior and relied instead only on his sister’s conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that the instructional error was harmless.[11]

Conclusion

¶62 For all of the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of conviction and the order denying postconviction relief.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.








[1] The warrant application suggests that there may have been some question as to which of two residences was Sveum’s primary residence. That question is not important for purposes here, and we will generally refer to Sveum’s residence without specifying which residence we mean.

[2] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. The stalking statute under which Sveum was charged provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) In this section:

(a) “Course of conduct” means a series of 2 or more acts carried out over time, however short or long, that show a continuity of purpose, including any of the following:

1. Maintaining a visual or physical proximity to the victim.

….

6. Contacting the victim by telephone or causing the victim’s telephone or any other person’s telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously, regardless of whether a conversation ensues.

….

(2) Whoever meets all of the following criteria is guilty of a Class I felony:

(a) The actor intentionally engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person under the same circumstances to fear bodily injury to or the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her family or household.

(b) The actor intends that at least one of the acts that constitute the course of conduct will place the specific person in reasonable fear of bodily injury to or the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her family or household.

(c) The actor’s acts induce fear in the specific person of bodily injury to or the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her family or household.

….

(3) Whoever violates sub. (2) is guilty of a Class F felony if any of the following applies:

….

(b) The actor has … a previous conviction under this section …, the victim of that crime is the victim of the present violation of sub. (2), and the present violation occurs within 7 years after the prior conviction.

WIS. STAT. § 940.32.

[3] Whether the court order that authorized police use of the GPS device here can technically be considered a warrant is unclear, but resolving this question is not important for purposes of our decision.

[4] In United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), the Supreme Court did not address the issue because the defendant there believed he lacked standing to challenge the placement of the “beeper.” Id. at 279 n.*.

[5] We are aware of no constitutional rule that requires suppression of incriminating conversations obtained by an authorized wiretap solely because the wiretap also captures private conversations in which the government has no legitimate interest and could not otherwise intercept. We note, however, that federal and Wisconsin law require that authorities “minimize” the interception of the latter category of conversations. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) (“[18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)] does not forbid the interception of all nonrelevant conversations, but rather instructs the agents to conduct the surveillance in such a manner as to ‘minimize’ the interception of such conversations.”); WIS. STAT. § 968.30(5) (2007-08) (Wisconsin’s counterpart to the federal minimization statute).

[6] In the stalking context, the “course of conduct” element can now be satisfied with evidence that a defendant used “electronic means” to monitor or record the activities of the victim. WIS. STAT. § 940.32(1)(a)6m. (2007-08). But that conduct alone is not prohibited. There must also be proof, among other elements, that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress or fear harm. WIS. STAT. § 940.32(2) (2007-08). Thus, using a GPS device to secretly monitor someone, without more, is not prohibited by the stalking statute.

[7] All references to Wisconsin’s Electronic Surveillance Control Law, WIS. STAT. §§ 968.27-.33, are to the 2007-08 version.

[8] The complaint states that Sveum’s 2003 charge for stalking covered conduct from 1999 through 2003 but, for ease of discussion, we refer to Sveum’s conduct only by reference to 2003.

[9] Sveum also argues that the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant when they seized financial documents. Sveum does not, however, indicate what types of financial documents he is talking about or explain why such documents fell outside the scope of the warrant. Accordingly, we consider this argument no further. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (we need not consider arguments that are inadequately briefed).

[10] In a subsequent version of the statute, the causing-any-person alternative applies to all of the other types of acts listed, including the two listed in Sveum’s jury instruction. See WIS. STAT. § 940.32(1)(a) (2003-04).

[11] We note that, consistent with Sveum’s charge, the jury was given the party-to-a-crime instruction. Sveum argues that this instruction “compounded” the error because applying the party-to-a-crime statute to the stalking statute would render WIS. STAT. § 940.32(1)(a)10. superfluous. Sveum does not develop this argument until his reply brief, and even then he does not address case law setting forth the standards for determining whether the party-to-a-crime statute applies. See, e.g., State v. Tronca, 84 Wis. 2d 68, 84-85, 267 N.W.2d 216 (1978); State v. Curbello-Rodriguez, 119 Wis. 2d 414, 432-33, 351 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1984). Accordingly, we decline to address this topic further. See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646-47.

Special thank you to Rhonda Martinson with the Battered Women's Justice Project for this information.



"No

Domestic violence, rape, stalking, cyberstalking victims & those who love, serve and support them unite to fight re-victimization today!

There is nothing worse for a victim than being re-victimized by organizations that are supposed to be there to assist. If you are a victim of rape, domestic violence, stalking or cyberstalking or work in public safety who is frustrated and tired of the run around make your voices heard. E-mail newly appointed White House advisor Sarah Lynn Rosenthal lrosenthal@ovp.eop.gov and political leaders to let them know that the status quo is not acceptable.

A special thank you to Gary Cunningham founder and President of, the non-profit crime victims organization Victim Protection Inc., in Black Hawk, Colorado for taking time to contact his state representatives and for making his voice heard.

Thank you to Maria Phelps in New York 4Survivors.blogspot.com for your efforts, Myra Spearman of Indiana, CEO of The Weaker Vessel, Randi Rosen, CEO of Women's Legal Resource, Family Law Court Reformers and others who have bravely taken action to help promote reform and change so that "No Victim is Left Behind".

It is very easy to stand by and complain or do nothing, it is those who take action that deserve praise and respect. The individuals mentioned are those who have taken action to help end the run around experienced by victims of crime. May their efforts not be in vain.

If you are a victim frustrated by the lack of resources or if you are a service provider who knows that victims are falling through the cracks, contact Survivors In Action today share your story. Unite to fight re-victimization.

Survivors In Action, a non-profit national advocacy group that supports crime victims and their families, has joined President Obama and the Department of Justice’s Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) in commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).

VAWA was passed on September 13, 1994, to improve the criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking and to increase the availability of services for victims of these crimes. The OVW oversees the financial and technical assistance provided to communities nationwide to help them create programs, policies, and practices to end domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking.

In a recent letter, Acting Director of the OVW Catherine Pierce stated: “Since the enactment of the VAWA, countless lives have been saved, the voices of survivors have been heard, and families have been protected. Most important, the criminal justice system’s understanding of the complex responses needed to address domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence and stalking has grown.”

Pierce goes on to announce “a year-long campaign to raise public awareness, to build stronger coalitions among federal, state, local and tribal communities, and to redouble our efforts to end domestic and dating violence, sexual assault and stalking for men, women and children across the country.”

SIA agrees that significant progress has been made since the passage of VAWA and applauds the OVW’s commitment to take even stronger action to ensure that services are available to all victims, increase cooperation among agencies, and end the violence. In response to Pierce’s memo, SIA President and Founder Alexis A. Moore stated “Many victims continue to be turned away from federally and state-funded domestic violence organizations, so there is still much work to be done. SIA believes that certain changes are a prerequisite to ending the violence, saving lives, and giving victims renewed hope.”

The changes Moore is referring to are to:
1) Implement uniform protocols and procedures in every state to ensure that each federally and state-funded domestic violence victim organization operates under the same standards—ones that ensure victims are not turned away and get the help they need.
2) Have a liaison in each state that victims and their advocates can contact to voice concerns and complaints when victims do not receive the assistance they need, as well as to report positive experiences. The state liaison could be a representative of one of the many non-profit organizations or state coalitions willing to serve as a clearinghouse. Today’s technology permits many things to be accomplished quickly and effectively, making it possible for such a clearinghouse to begin operating rapidly and at minimal or even no cost.
3) Form a national oversight agency or committee, reporting to Lynn Rosenthal, White House Advisor on Violence Against Women, to which state DV agencies and resources would be accountable and would report what is and isn’t working, and to which state liaisons could escalate grievances that cannot be resolved at the state level.
4) Organize and provide strong leadership for the many non-profits, volunteers, and other individuals working to bring about domestic violence resource reform.

Moore concluded: “We believe the appointment of Lynn Rosenthal as a White House Advisor signals recognition on at the highest levels of government that the critical problem of domestic violence needs a higher profile and more effective action. Ms. Rosenthal, along with an effective oversight committee, can provide that leadership and organization.

“SIA has offered to help Ms. Rosenthal by serving as a liaison to the White House, forming an oversight committee, and organizing the diverse resources committed to this cause. Meanwhile, in the spirit of the VAWA, we will continue to advocate and work for the changes needed to bring domestic violence resources, protocols, and procedures into the 21st century. Our goal is to prevent more victims from falling through the cracks.”

Survivors In Action (SIA) is a non-profit national advocacy group that supports victims and the families of victims of any crime. Other national organizations typically help victims at specific points in their victimization cycle—such as when they first report the crime or in writing parole opposition letters—leaving “gaps” in needed services. SIA fills the gaps, providing support through all stages of the journey from victim to survivor, with no time limitations, cut-off dates, or conditions, helping to ensure that no victim is left behind.

Survivors In Action
"No Victim Left Behind"

VAWA & US DOJ dollars need to be allocated to organizations that do the work, support the efforts of agencies that ensure "No Victim is Left Behind"

There are way too many organizations being funded by government tax dollars who do literally nothing to help victims of crime yet they are granted the "Lions Share" of the funding.

The reality for victims of domestic violence, rape, stalking and cyberstalking is not what is being portrayed by the media or by the organizations that receive millions in funding every year.

Survivors In Action received an email from Michelle Garcia the executive director of the National Stalking Resource Center requesting that Survivors In Action not refer victims to the agency because they are not a victim service provider. Confused I visited the National Stalking Resource Center web site where it indicates that they do serve victims and for victims to call the hotline?

Are you Confused?

Me too, but needless to say this is the typical run around victims of domestic violence, cyberstalking and stalking deal with on a daily basis and this is unacceptable.

Many organizations that are receiving VAWA dollars, (your tax dollars) are wasting the money and not doing what is needed to help and assist victims.

VAWA (Violence Against Women Act)dollars are being wasted and victims are being left behind.

It is time for the organizations that do the work and actually support the victims to be allocated the funding so that "No Victim is Left Behind".

Survivors In Action and others continue to push for DV Reform so that victims of abuse, rape and stalking receive the services that they need.

When will VP Biden listen?....

When will President Obama do more than sign a domestic violence proclamation?...

Appointing Lynn Rosenthal was a good start, however now is the time for the White House to do more than read our blogs and emails, it is time for action.

Every dollar wasted on a failing program is a dollar that could be allocated to a program and service that actually works to help victims.

Domestic violence (DV) victims continue to suffer and die at the hands of their abusers—and even one victim who suffers or one life that’s lost to domestic violence is way too many. Yet the victims of domestic violence and their children are not getting what they need from the organizations that have been established to help them. Quite simply, victims are falling through the cracks. In the United States and in the 21st century, there simply is no excuse for this.

The appointment of Lynn Rosenthal as White House Advisor on Violence Against Women (VAW) signals recognition on the part of the White House that the critical problem of domestic violence needs a higher profile. Ms. Rosenthal has the opportunity to spearhead real, effective change that will save lives and give victims renewed hope—if she provides strong leadership and uses her position to enforce accountability on the part of agencies that provide services to victims.

More specifically, what kinds of change should Ms. Rosenthal make? Here are the key steps I think she should take:

1) Implement uniform protocols and procedures in every state to ensure that every federally and state-funded domestic violence victim organization operates under the same standards—standards that ensure that victims are not turned away and get the help they need.

2) Appoint a liaison in each state that victims and their advocates can contact to voice concerns and complaints when victims are refused service or do not receive the assistance they need, as well as report positive experiences. The state liaison does not necessarily have to be a public official (such as California Domestic Violence Committee Chair Fiona Ma). It could be a representative of any one of the many non-profit organizations—such as Survivors in Action—or state coalitions willing to serve as a clearinghouse. Today’s technology permits many things to be accomplished quickly and effectively, making it possible for such a clearinghouse to begin operating rapidly and at minimal or even no cost.

3) Form a national oversight agency or committee, reporting to her, to which state DV agencies and resources would be accountable and would report what is and isn’t working, and to which state liaisons could escalate grievances that cannot be resolved at the state level.

4) Provide strong, effective leadership for the many non-profits, volunteers, and other individuals who are eager to bring about domestic violence resource reform. To be effective, all these resources need to be marshaled and organized. Lynn Rosenthal, along with an effective oversight committee, can provide that leadership and organization. I am happy to offer my services and those of Survivors In Action to serve as a liaison to the White House, help form an oversight committee, and organize the wealth of resources committed to this cause.

Survivors In Action
"No Victim Left Behind"

Survivors In Action
"No Victim Left Behind"

Identity theft as abuse impacting victims of domestic violence and their children

Today, there are increasing numbers of cases involving identity theft and domestic abuse. Domestic violence and stalking victims often fall prey to a form of identity theft which is often referred to by experts and prosecutors as "identity theft as abuse"- a subset of cyberstalking.

Identity Theft as Abuse is unique from traditional identity theft crimes because instead of the intent/purpose being for "financial gain", domestic abusers utilize these tactics in order to continue to have power and control over their victims.

Domestic violence abusers armed with their victims personal identifying information often apply for credit cards, magazine subscriptions, e-mail accounts, create web sites including my space and facebook accounts and use the victims identifying information to reek havoc upon their lives-often causing damage to the victims credit and reputation both of which are very difficult to restore once they are lost.

Cases involving identity theft as abuse were often ignored by the courts and law enforcement until now; primarily thanks to the hard work of the prosecutors involved in the Peck case of Wisconsin. The Wisconsin court of appeals affirmed the conviction against Peck providing a new hope for victims of cyberstalking and in particular victims of "identity theft as abuse" - the majority of which are domestic violence and stalking victims.

Peck case synopsis:

WI Ct of Appeal - signing ex-wife up for subscriptions, etc. can be I.D.theft

State v. Peck
Docket: 2007AP002732 11-19-08
PER CURIAM. A jury convicted Daniel J. Peck of three counts of identity theft, finding that he engaged in conduct intended "to harm the reputation, property, person, or estate" of his ex-wife, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 943.201(2)(c) (2005-06). Peck argues on appeal, as he did on motions after verdict, that the word "harm" is unconstitutionally vague and that the State failed to prove that he intended to harm his ex-wife's reputation, property, person or estate. The trial court denied his motions, concluding that the jury permissibly gave the word its ordinary meaning, and that the evidence was sufficient. We agree and affirm.

A special thanks to Attorney Rhonda Martinson with the Battered Women's Justice Project for providing the case information.

If you suspect that you may be a victim of identity theft as abuse or cyberstalking or wish to learn more regarding how you can prevent these crimes, contact Alexis A. Moore directly by e-mail Alexis@survivorsinaction.com or your local domestic violence center for more information.

Note:

James Devendorf law student at UC Berkeley is writing a paper on identity theft in the context of domestic abuse.

If you are a victim of identity theft as abuse or cyberstalking by a former intimate partner/domestic abuser please contact James directly by email at devendorf@gmail.com.

From victim to victor, not an easy task for cyberstalking victims

Christopher Burgess, tech security expert and Survivors In Action advisory board member, most recent blog provides much needed discussion regarding how little forward progress has been made in preventing or protection victims of cyberstalking emphasizing further that not all 50 states have cyberstalking laws on the books, which I know is making it more difficult for victims to find resolve and support.

Often I am asked about Cyberstalking stats, they are not readily available as is the data from other crimes cyberstalking is not a crime in all 50 states and many states tend to lump cyberstalking crimes with identity theft making statistical data almost impossible to obtain until something changes. To learn more about cyberstalking facts and statistics read you need to read this piece on the topic for About.com by Alexis A. Moore


Survivors In Action
"No Victim Left Behind"